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Abstract: We use rich brand level retail data to demonstrate that the firm size distribution in
Carbonated Soft Drinks is mainly an outcome of the degree to which firms own a portfolio of
brands across segments of the market, and not from performance within segments. In addition,
while the number of firms in each segment is limited by segment size relative to sunk cost and
competition in a segment, idiosyncratic firm effects make some firms more likely to participate in




n this paper we model firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks
using Sutton (1998). Rather than looking for an exact size distribution, he
derives a lower bound to firm size distribution that will hold in any industry
where firms operate over segments, or islands. The lower bound is an outcome
of a sequence of deterministic entry games across segments. Theoretically,
coverage of segments becomes more important than the details of events
within segments in determining firm size distribution. Empirically, this has
been validated for the US Cement Industry (Sutton, 1998), the Spanish Retail
Banking Sector (De Juan, 1999), and the Italian Motor Insurance Industry
(Buzzacchi and Valletti, 1999). These studies find that firm size is mainly
determined by the degree to which a firm has a presence across many
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over many geographical locations, or segments. In keeping with Sutton’s
(1998) theory, heterogeneity in the degree to which firms participate over
segments of a market can by itself explain most of the observed firm size
distribution in these industries. 
In this paper we wish to model firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft
Drinks as an outcome of the degree to which firms cover vertical (flavour,
packaging, diet attributes) segments of the market, using retail brand data
described in Section II. In Section III of the paper we show that the different
degree to which firms operate over segments of the market places Sutton’s
(1998) mathematically predicted lower bound on the shape of the firm size
distribution of Carbonated Soft Drinks. This portfolio effect explains most of
the actual firm size distribution. 
In Section IV of the paper we model the factors that characterise firm
entry across our segments. We find that segment size relative to the sunk cost,
and competitive conduct among firm populations limit the number of firms
that enter a segment. We also find that idiosyncratic firm characteristics make
some firms more likely to have taken up a position in any given segment. This
latter feature of the industry is the key to modelling firm size distribution in
Carbonated Soft Drinks. The skewness results mainly from the heterogeneous
take-up of segments, and not from firm performance within certain segments.
So while Coca-Cola has on average 52 per cent of the Carbonated Soft Drinks
retail market in Ireland over the period 1992-1997, its dominance does not
result from its performance in the Cola market. Rather its success lies in the
establishment of a portfolio of brands across 91 per cent of segments. Key
brands include Fanta in Orange, Sprite in Lemonade, and Lilt in Mixed Fruit
in addition to its Coca-Cola brand. Small firms can co-exist with large firms in
this market by operating with popular brands within one or two segments. 
II DATA DESCRIPTION
AC Nielsen of Ireland has collated a panel database of all brands in
Carbonated Soft Drinks distributed throughout Irish retail stores for use in
our empirical analysis. The evolution of the Irish retail grocery market
structure from the early 1970s is described in Walsh and Whelan (1999a).1 The
database provides bi-monthly population data spanning October 1992 to
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1 The introduction of foreign competition into the chain store market, which induced structural
upheaval in the market, did not take place until the end of 1998. Both international and national
companies distributed their brands throughout a retail structure that was very stable through the
period analysed in this paper.
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istics within Carbonated Soft Drinks. We are bound by a contract of
confidentiality with AC Nielsen not to reveal information not otherwise
available on the market. 
We  have extensive bi-monthly brand level information regarding brand
retail price (average of individual brand prices across all stores selling the
brand, weighted by brand sales share within the store), sales units (in ml) and
value (in £000), firm attachment and their vertical (flavour, packaging, and
diet) characteristics. An interesting feature of the AC Nielsen data is their
identification of various segments within the market for Carbonated Soft
Drinks, which group clusters of brands by various vertical attributes. AC
Nielsen identify 40 segments: 4 flavours (Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed
Fruit), by 5 different packaging types (Cans, Standard Bottle, 1.5 Litre, 2 Litre
and Multi-Pack of Cans) and 2 different sweeteners, diet and regular.
Packaging format is recognised as a crucial feature of this market by the
industry. Over 90 per cent of cans and standard bottles are impulse buys
distributed through small corner stores and garage forecourts rather than
chain stores. In contrast, the majority of 2 litre and multi-pack cans are
distributed through one-stop supermarket shops. The industry has clearly
introduced different packaging to satisfy different consumer needs within both
the impulse and one-stop shopping segments (Walsh and Whelan, 1999a and
1999b). 
We define the firm business as Carbonated Soft Drinks, but within this
market firms take up various positions or “roles” across vertical segments. So
if a firm operates in all segments, it has adopted 40 different roles. Details of
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Table 1: Firm Roles (R) and Brands (B) in Segments of Carbonated Drinks,
Oct. 1992-May 1997
Cans Standard 1.5 Litre 2 Litre Multipk Cans
R (B) R (B) R (B) R (B) R (B)
Regular Cola 4 (7) 6 (11) 3 (3) 4 (5) 2 (6)
Diet Cola  3 (5) 2 (3) 2 (4) 3 (5) 2 (5)
Regular Orange 4 (6) 5 (13) 4 (6) 4 (5) 3 (5)
Diet Orange 1 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (3)
Regular Lemonade 2 (4) 3 (7) 2 (4) 2 (4) 1 (2)
Diet Lemonade 1 (2) 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2)
Regular Mixed Fruit 6 (8) 7 (21) 6 (7) 5 (9) 1 (1)
Diet Mixed Fruit 1 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Total Number of Firm Roles = 100 Total Number of Brands = 178
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out in Table 1. Interestingly, there are only 100 roles taken up, on average, by
the 13 firms. If every firm operated in every segment we would have 13 roles
in each of the 40 segments giving a total of 520 roles. There is a very
heterogeneous and a persistent pattern in the take up of roles by firms across
vertical segments. This will be shown to be a key structural feature of the
industry in determining the limiting firm size distribution.
III  FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION IN CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS 
The key structural feature of Sutton’s (1998) theory of limiting firm size
distribution is the arrival, in the history of a defined market, of a number of
discrete investment opportunities (segments) over an infinite period for firm
populations. Assuming opportunities of equal size arrive and can only be filled
by one firm, the market begins with a single firm of size 1. Each subsequent
opportunity is taken up by either a new firm or existing firm. If opportunities
were taken up in succession by new firms, the resultant limiting size
distribution will display perfect equality between firms of size 1. Differences
in firm size emerge when firms have taken up a different portfolio of
opportunities or, what Sutton labels, roles in the market.  Sutton (1998) puts
weak restrictions on the form of the entry game into each of these segments as
they arrive in the history of the market to model a lower bound on the size
distribution of firms in a market. 
Sutton (1998) derives his lower bound within a game-theoretic model
using a Symmetry Principle when modelling deterministic entry processes
across the segments of the market.2 This ensures that all potential entrants
are treated equally in their probability of taking up a position or role in a
segment. In the limit, this allows a prediction on the lower bound to firm size
distribution, or a minimal degree of skewness between firms. 
In the lower bound, unequal firm size distributions at the product level
can only be driven by the heterogeneous take-up of roles across segments.
Firm size distribution is based on a simple count of roles across segments and
is restricted to a lower bound Lorenz curve that graphs the fraction of top k
ranking firms in the population N of firms, k/N, against their corresponding
share of market assets given by the k-firm concentration ratio, Ck, that
satisfies,
k            k Ck ≥ —  1 – ln —  (1)
N      N
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2 The Symmetry Principle is based on the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) concept of symmetry and
subgame consistency. 
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bound to firm size distribution in a market that is associated with a measure
of inequality that is approximately equal to a Gini coefficient of 0.5.
If there is a size advantage so that bigger firms in the market are more
likely to take up a role in a segment, this has the effect of introducing greater
heterogeneity between firms in the market and so the resulting Lorenz curve
will not violate the predicted lower bound. Moreover, the lower bound predicts
the minimal degree of skewness between firms assuming all roles, both within
and across all segments, are of equal size. It is clear that in fact, the size of
firm roles may be very different within a segment (difference in the degree of
short-run price competition), and hence across segments, which introduces
additional heterogeneity between firms in the market and so greater
skewness. Thus, the actual firm size distribution that allows for roles of
different sizes will result in a Lorenz curve that lies above that based on a
pure count of roles. This is the basic proposition in the theorem of
majorisation: the Lorenz curve associated with the actual distribution based
on sales will be further away from the diagonal than that induced by
measuring size as a pure count of roles (Marshall and Olkin, 1979).   
The actual firm size distribution observed in the Carbonated Soft Drinks
market is illustrated in Figure 1, both for the average over the five-year period
and for each bi-monthly period. This measures firm size as total firm sales in
the business of Carbonated Soft Drinks, and plots the fraction of top k ranking
firms in Carbonated Soft Drinks, k/N, against their corresponding market
share in Carbonated Soft Drinks. N is the total number of firms and Ck
describes the k-firm sales concentration ratio in the market. For example, the
top two firms collectively account for on average, 73 per cent of the market. We
do not observe a violation of the predicted lower bound in our scatter of points
in any bi-monthly period. The corresponding Gini coefficient measure of
inequality is 0.72, which clearly exceeds the mathematically predicted lower
bound. 
We  now examine whether the presence of firms operating over vertical
segments in Carbonated Soft Drinks places this lower bound on the shape of
the firm size distribution. Each firm has only one role in each of the segments
in which it is active. A count of roles in the Carbonated Soft Drinks market
indicates the number of segments across which a firm operates. Firm
operations over vertical segments (flavour, packaging, diet attributes), on
average, range from 2 to 91 per cent with a tendency for higher ranked firms
to cover relatively more segments in Carbonated Soft Drinks. Measuring firm
size purely as a count of roles, such that the size of a firm is just the total
number of segments over which it operates, gives a firm size distribution
where heterogeneity in firm size can only result due to firms participating in
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Figure 1: Actual Firm Size Distribution in the Irish Carbonated Soft Drinks
Firm Size Distribution in Carbonated Drinks:
Average over Oct. 1992-March 1997
month = 0 month = 1 month = 2 month = 3 month = 4 month = 5
month = 6 month = 7 month = 8 month = 9 month = 10 month = 11
month = 12 month = 13 month = 14 month = 15 month = 16 month = 17
month = 18 month = 19 month = 20 month = 21 month = 22 month = 23
month = 24 month = 25 month = 26
Top K/N Firms in Carbonates
Firm Size Distribution in Carbonated Drinks:
Bi-Monthly: 1992-March 1997
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Figure 2: Firm Size Distribution Based on a Count of Roles over 40 Segments
(Flavour by Packaging by Diet)
Firm Size Distribution in Carbonated Drinks:
due to Coverage of Segments: Bi-Monthly Average for Oct. 1992-March 1997
month = 0 month = 1 month = 2 month = 3 month = 4 month = 5
month = 6 month = 7 month = 8 month = 9 month = 10 month = 11
month = 12 month = 13 month = 14 month = 15 month = 16 month = 17
month = 18 month = 19 month = 20 month = 21 month = 22 month = 23
month = 24 month = 25 month = 26
Top K/N Firms in Carbonates
Firm Size Distribution in Carbonated Drinks:
due to Coverage of Segments: Bi-Monthly Oct. 1992-March 1997
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illustrates the size distribution of firms on the basis of a count of roles across
vertical segments (flavour, packaging, diet attributes), within Carbonated Soft
Drinks on average over the five-year period, and for each bi-monthly period.
The fit of the data to the theoretically predicted lower bound Lorenz Curve is
remarkably tight for each and every period. Firm size inequality is driven only
by the heterogeneous operation of firms across vertical segments, corresponds
to a Gini coefficient of 0.56, and lies above the mathematically derived lower
bound predicted in Sutton (1998). The actual size distribution in Figure 1
which allows for the fact that roles can be of different size both within and
across segments, with a corresponding Gini coefficient of 0.72, is above that
observed for the size distribution based on a count of roles across 40 vertical
segments. 
IV MODELLING FIRM PARTICIPATION IN SEGMENTS OF
CARBONATED DRINKS
The key structural aspect that needs to be modelled to explain firm size
distribution is simply the participation rates of firms across segments. As
indicated in Figure 2, participation rates have been very stable over the five-
year period examined. Although there is little variation in participation rates
by firms over time, we do have variation in firm participation across the 40
segments. In addition, the number of roles within segments is surprisingly
concentrated, as documented in Table 1. In this section we model the
heterogeneous take-up of roles by firms in the history of the market in the
spirit of the seminal work by Bresnahan and Reis (1991).  
They estimate discrete game-theoretic entry models to relate shifts in
market demand to changes in the equilibrium number of firms. Bresnahan
and Reis (1991) use a cross section of 202 geographically concentrated markets
to conduct this empirical comparative static exercise. In competitive regional
markets, variations in the number of incumbent firms and market size would
identify firm’s fixed costs relative to demand as stated by the Traditional Limit
Theorem, see Sutton (1991). In oligopolistic regional markets, anticipated
competitor behaviour can also act as a barrier to entry. As in Sutton (1991) the
expectation of ex-post entry price and non-price competition also drives
equilibrium concentration. The problem is that competitive conduct among
entrants and potential entrants is hard to measure empirically. They impose
structure motivated from theory to control for such omitted variable bias in
order to identify firm’s fixed costs relative to demand using data on number of
incumbent firms and market size in oligopolistic markets. 
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segments that result from strategic conduct among the firms and different
segment sizes relative to sunk costs in Carbonated Soft Drinks. Our cross
section is in terms of vertical segments rather then geographical regions. We
estimate a simple discrete choice model of firm entry to evaluate the impact of
segment size (£000) relative to sunk cost (median firm size in segment, £000)
on participation rates, while controlling for unobserved but deterministic
segment and firm specific effects. We use segment dummies to control for
heterogeneous competitive conduct within segments, and firm dummies to
control for the possibility that some firms may have a strategic advantage in
taking up roles across the segments relative to other firms. We estimate the
following linear probability model,
P{Frs = 1 | Xf}= G(β0 Sizes /σs + β1 Ss + β2 Ff) (2)
Where Frs adopts a value of 1 if a firm has a role in a segment, and 0
otherwise. The participation rates of firms in segments vary substantially
across firms, but have little variation over time and so we model the average
participation rate over the five-year period. The participation rate is modelled
todependuponsegment size (£000) Sizes relative to sunk costs σs (proxied with
median firm size in a segment, £000) averaged over the period in question.
Unobservable segment and firm characteristics are controlled for with a
dummy variable for each segment, Ss, and for each firm, Ff, in the business of
Carbonated Soft Drinks. Having data on segment market size, sunk costs and
role attachment to firms allows us control for strategic conduct in this way. 
Table 2 presents the results of our empirical analysis. All explanatory
variables are highly significant. Transforming the coefficients of our
regression into marginal effects on the estimated participation of firms in
segments, we first compute the predicted number of firms in each segment
that is driven by segment size relative to sunk costs, controlling for other
factors. Clearly the relationship between numbers of firms in a segment and
segment size relative to sunk cost is shifted by the strategic conduct of firms.
The true partial relationship is illustrated in Figure 3, where we observe as
segment size relative to sunk costs rise, the number of roles in a segment
increases at a diminishing rate. 
In a similar way, we transform the coefficients of our firm dummies to
ascertain whether certain firms are estimated to have a greater probability of
entering a given segment, controlling for other factors. Using the estimated
probability, we predict the number of segments that a firm would be expected
to capture out of the possible 40 segments. This is plotted against the rank of
firms in the Carbonated Soft drinks market in Figure 4. The negative
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on average, taken up more roles over segments historically. Such firm specific
effects may reflect some sort of strategic advantage from advertising, first
mover advantage or scope economies. It may simply be that the firm has been
in the market longer. 
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Table 2: Firm Participation in Segments – Logit Regression Results
Dependent Variable





Segment Size/Median Firm Size in Segment 0.19
(3.1)*




Figure 3: The Predicted Number of Firms in Segment (Roles) by Segment
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observed in Carbonated Soft Drinks. Coca-Cola is ranked one in the
Carbonated Soft Drinks retail market in Ireland over the period 1992-1997,
but its dominance does not result from its performance in the Cola market.
Rather its success lies in the establishment of a portfolio of brands across 91
per cent of vertical segments. Small firms can co-exist with large firms in this
market by operating only in a few of the concentrated segments. 
V CONCLUSION
We  document how the different degree to which firms participate over
vertical segments places Sutton’s (1998) mathematically predicted lower
bound on the shape of the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks.
The key structural feature that explains firm size distribution is the
heterogeneous take-up of roles by firms across vertical segments during
market evolution. At the brand level one can see turbulence in the data. Yet,
all this bi-monthly micro-economic activity within segments does not override
the persistence and stable firm size distribution at the product level that
results from heterogeneous firm participation rates across segments. 
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Figure 4: The Predicted Number of Roles by Firm Rank, average over 
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segment size relative to sunk costs rise, the number of roles in a segment
increases at a diminishing rate. We also estimate that firm specific effects
have induced certain firms in Carbonated Soft Drinks to be more likely to have
taken a role in any given segment historically. Such firm specific effects may
reflect some sort of strategic effect, or may simply be due to the firm being in
the market longer. The size of firm portfolios is the key to understanding the
firm size distribution observed in Carbonated Soft Drinks. 
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